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ABSTRACT
As a part of the public governance, transparency started to come forward 
during the New Public Management reforms, mostly for the evaluation 
of public sector efficiency. This article focuses on online local budget 
transparency (OLBT) in two neighbouring countries – Croatia and Slove-
nia. The article is pioneering in a comparative study of the determinants 
of budget transparency in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries, based on a unique database and measure of transparency. The ar-
ticle tests the determinants of OLBT that reflect the accountability of 
local authorities and a cornerstone for public participation in the budget 
process. The following methodology was applied: using a data set of 768 
Slovenian and Croatian local governments over the 2015–2017 period 
and testing it against several financial and socio-economic variables, and 
a random effects panel logistic regression, separately for Croatia, Slove-
nia, and a pooled sample. The results indicate that greater size of the 
population, higher administrative capacity and lower unemployment rate 
in individual local governments significantly contribute to higher levels of 
OLBT. This study demonstrates the possibility of developing a standard-
ised measure of local budget transparency and using it to investigate the 
reasons for different levels of transparency in the two – and potentially 
other – CEE countries. The results of this and similar studies can serve as 
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a basis for establishing cohesive local budget transparency policies for 
different countries and creating a combination of policy instruments to 
enhance transparency.
Keywords: local self-government, online local budget transparency, panel data 
analysis, Croatia, Slovenia
JEL: H70, H83
1 Introduction
Traditional public administration theories were not too preoccupied with 
transparency. However, when economic - especially managerial – ideas be-
came popular, the new public management started to treat it as one of the 
tools for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of public services (Doug-
las and Meijer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014). Usually connected 
with ‘good governance’, despite an extensive range of typologies (Lampro-
poulou and Oikonomou, 2018; Ongaro, 2009; Osborne, 2006), transparency 
has been determined to be one of the important principles in the new public 
management. According to the Strategy on Innovation and Good Governance 
at Local Level (Council of Europe, 2007) one of the principles of good demo-
cratic governance is ‘Openness and Transparency, to ensure public access to in-
formation	and	facilitate	understanding	of	how	local	public	affairs	are	conducted’.	
In line with that, budget transparency (BT) and citizens’ participation have also 
become to be considered critical elements for efficient public service delivery, 
government accountability and citizen trust, particularly at local government 
levels (e.g., OECD, 2017; Pina et al., 2010; Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007).
Transparency is now being mentioned in the strategic documents of two 
neighbouring countries, Croatia and Slovenia, once constituent republics of 
the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, as one of the principles of 
good governance and a necessary part of public administration reforms. This 
research, in line with this endeavour, focuses on online local budget transpar-
ency (OLBT) in the two states. Nevertheless, despite the same regulations 
applying, the levels of OLBT differ among local governments even within the 
individual countries. This article, then, investigates the determinants of OLBT 
while keeping in mind the various approaches in the existing literature (e.g., 
Caba Pérez et al., 2005; Gandía and Archidona, 2008; Gesuele and Metallo, 
2017; Lowatcharin and Menifield, 2015), which show the heterogeneity and 
dependency of different determinants (Alcaide-Muñoz and Rodríguez Bolívar, 
2015; Alcaide Muñoz et al., 2017). It has been proved that information and 
communication technologies (ICT) can improve openness and transparency 
by using web-based tools to provide better information (Wong and Welch, 
2004). However, there is still a relatively small number of studies focusing on 
online budget transparency (e.g., Caba-Pérez et al., 2008; García-Tabuyo et al., 
2016; Laswad et al., 2005; Lowatcharin and Menifield, 2015; Sedmihradská, 
2015; Pintea et al., 2013; Pintea, 2014; Styles and Tennyson, 2007).
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To establish the determinants of OLBT, it was first necessary to measure it, 
i.e. to find out how many of five local budget documents that have been iden-
tified as crucially important (the year-end report, mid-year report, budget 
proposal, enacted budget and citizens’ budget) 212 Slovenian municipalities 
and 126 cities and 428 municipalities in Croatia are publishing on their web 
sites. After that, in order to test the influence of independent variables on 
the inclination of local government units (LGUs) to publish key local budget 
documents, a random effects panel logistic regression for 2015-2017 period 
is used, separately for Croatian and Slovenian LGUs and then for the whole 
sample. The analysis shows that higher populations, higher administrative 
capacities and lower unemployment rates in an LGU contribute significantly 
to greater OLBT. These results are in line with those previously obtained by 
other researchers. Although the article has some limitations, outlined below, 
the findings might add to the existing literature, as research of this kind and 
with such comprehensive data collection is relatively rare in Central and East-
ern Europe. It might be significant that similar determinants have similar influ-
ences on the LBT in two relatively young, ex-socialist countries to those that 
have been observed in more established, older public administrations.
The following section presents the theoretical and research background and 
development of hypotheses for the determinants of OLBT, the third describes 
the data and the research methodology, the fourth offers results and analysis, 
and the fifth concludes and summarizes observations and recommendations.
2 Literature review
Definitions of transparency, as well as of budget transparency, can be broader 
or narrower (Lowatcharin and Menifield, 2015). Fiscal and budget transpar-
ency are often used as synonyms (Alt et al, 2006; OECD, 2017), but fiscal trans-
parency is a wider concept than budget transparency (Kopits and Craig, 1998).
There are various theoretical approaches to transparency. The principal-agent 
theory usually describes the information gap between citizens and the gov-
ernment as a major obstacle to effective and constructive public participa-
tion. Because of the information gap, the agent has an advantage in per-
suading citizens (the principal) that everything is done in their best interests 
(Groenendijk, 1997). Some authors stress the importance of transparency in 
diminishing the information gap (e.g. Ferejohn, 1999; Laswad et al., 2005; Zim-
merman, 1977; Banker and Patton, 1987). According to the legitimacy theory 
(Suchman, 1995; Patten, 1992; Deegan, 2002; De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero, 
2016; Alcaide Muñoz et al., 2017), government uses transparency to promote 
its legitimacy and reputation. Alesina and Perotti (1996) elaborated the fis-
cal illusion theory, which draws on the perception that the citizen (taxpayer) 
is not capable of evaluating the cost of public programmes. Fiscal transpar-
ency helps to overcome that problem by giving citizens more information, 
and, therefore decreasing the illusion produced by the underestimated costs 
and overestimated benefits of public spending. All these theories are in line 
with the notion of transparency as a principle of good governance. However, 
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it is questionable whether it is enough to establish a principle and to make 
administrative reforms towards good governance. Hence, the motivation for 
testing some of the variables that might determine the budget transparency, 
in this case, OLBT.
2.1 Development of hypotheses
Motivated by the detailed literature review presented in Stanić (2018), and 
using the theories explained above, five hypotheses were developed, posit-
ing residents’ income per capita (p.c.), population size, fiscal capacity, adminis-
trative capacity and unemployment, the most often used socio-demographic, 
fiscal and political variables, as determining factors in the achievement of 
budget transparency, or the reverse.
2.1.1 Residents’ income p.c.
According to several authors, residents with higher incomes usually have 
greater Internet access and experience (Styles and Tennyson, 2007). They 
are also more demanding in respect of additional public services (Giroux and 
McLelland, 2003; Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007) and information (Piotrows-
ki and Van Ryzin, 2007). In some research, residents’ income had no signifi-
cant correlation (Guillamón et al., 2011), while other studies (Lowatcharin and 
Menifield, 2015) showed a significant positive correlation between residents’ 
income p.c. and government transparency. Ott et al. (2018) and Ott et al. 
(2019) in the analysis of determinants of OLBT for Croatia also showed that 
residents’ income p.c. positively affects OLBT. Therefore, we assumed that:
H1. The	higher	the	residents’	income	p.c.,	the	greater	the	OLBT.
2.1.2 Population
Larger LGUs are more often pressured to provide information (Moon and Nor-
ris, 2005; Serrano-Cinca et al., 2009), and usually have higher revenues and an 
IT department (Caba-Pérez et al., 2008). Serrano-Cinca et al. (2009) argue that 
conflicts of interest are more likely in more populated areas and the advan-
tage of disclosing information is correspondingly greater.
Several authors found a positive and statistically significant relationship be-
tween population and data availability (Guillamón et al., 2011; del Sol, 2013; 
Lowatcharin and Menifield, 2015; De Araújo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016; Ott et 
al., 2018; Ott et al., 2019; Benčina et al., 2019). Therefore, we assumed that:
H2.	As	the	population	rises,	the	level	of	OLBT	increases.
2.1.3 Fiscal capacity
Fiscal capacity (FC) is the ability to raise revenues (Martinez-Vazquez and Ti-
mofeev, 2008). Some other authors use the concept of financial autonomy 
(Tavares and da Cruz, 2014). Residents’ income p.c. is linked to FC, since it im-
plies higher tax and nontax revenues. Alcaide Muñoz et al. (2017) argue that 
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larger cities are more likely to provide information, since they can afford it 
and that higher FC is followed by higher pressure from their citizens to justify 
the use of resources, so agents are keen to show that they act responsibly.
There are various proxies for the FC. Guillamón et al. (2011) used p.c. tax rev-
enues and obtained a positive correlation with financial transparency. Laswad 
et al. (2005) used general revenues minus intergovernmental transfers, find-
ing no significant correlation with voluntary Internet financial reporting. This 
study uses operating revenues (excluding grants) as a proxy for FC the vari-
able previously used in Ott et al. (2019) in Croatia that proved that it positively 
affects OLBT. Therefore, we assumed that:
H3.	The	higher	the	fiscal	capacity	in	an	LGU,	the	greater	its	OLBT.
2.1.4 Administrative capacity
The administrative capacity largely defines the ability to produce budget 
documents. Tavares and da Cruz (2014) show its influence associating it with 
a more professional organization and IT educated staff. This paper assumes 
that LGUs with a larger number of employees can more easily disclose more 
information.
The proxy for administrative capacity here is the natural logarithm of the an-
nual average number of employees in LGU bodies (based on hours worked). 
This variable was previously used in Ott et al. (2019) in Croatia and it was prov-
en that it positively affects OLBT. It assumes that LGUs with a larger number 
of employees have specialized staff able to devote additional time to OLBT. 
Therefore, we assumed that:
H4.	The	larger	the	labour	force	of	an	LGU,	the	greater	the	OLBT.
2.1.5 Unemployment
As explained in detail in Stanić (2018), it has been argued that lower economic 
development and the associated higher unemployment rates are damaging 
to civic engagement, i.e. the demand for greater opportunities to participate 
in the decision-making diminishes. Some studies have used unemployment as 
a proxy for an LGU’s economic status and found that higher economic status 
(lower unemployment) positively affects the transparency in public adminis-
tration (Piotrowski and van Ryzin, 2007). In accordance with these underpin-
nings, the results largely indicate that higher unemployment rates are det-
rimental to fiscal transparency (Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013; De Araújo and 
Tejedo-Romero, 2016; del Sol, 2013; Tavares and da Cruz, 2014). Thus, the 
following hypothesis is proposed:
H5.	The	lower	the	unemployment,	the	greater	the	OLBT.
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3 Data and methodology
This section presents the number and types of LGUs in Croatia and Slovenia, 
their regulation of the local budget transparency, dependent variable and 
sample, included independent variables; and finally, the model specification.
3.1 Local government and budget transparency in Croatia
Croatia consists of 428 municipalities, 128 cities and 20 counties. According 
to the Budget Act and Act on the Right of Access to Information, they are all 
obliged to publish three budget documents – the enacted budget, the year-
end report, and mid-year report - on their websites. For the additional two 
documents – budget proposal and citizen budget – there is no legal obliga-
tion, but only a recommendation from the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, in 
Croatia, three of the five key budget documents should be disclosed manda-
torily and the other two voluntarily.
3.2 Local government and budget transparency in Slovenia
Slovenia is divided into 212 municipalities, 11of which have urban status. In 
accordance with the Public Finance Act, they are legally obliged to publish 
three key budget documents – budget proposal, enacted budget, and a year-
end report. The publication of the remaining two documents – mid-year re-
port and citizen budget – is not statutory obligation. However, since 2016, the 
Ministry of Public Administration has recommended the publication of all five 
key documents. Therefore, in Slovenia, it is mandatory to disclose three of 
the five key budget documents but only voluntary to disclose the other two.
3.3 Dependent variable and sample
The dependent variable is the Open Local Budget Index (OLBI) developed 
by Ott et al. (2015), as a count data index that shows the availability of five 
key local budget documents on an LGU’s web site. It is calculated annually, 
e.g. OLBI 2017 includes year-end report 2016, mid-year report 2017, budget 
proposal, enacted budget and citizen budget 2018. The choice of these five 
budget documents is based on good international practices suggested by e.g. 
OECD (2002) and IBP (2016).
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Graph 1: Local governments’ average annual budget transparency score
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Graph 1 shows that the average OLBT in Croatia and Slovenia – measured by 
how many key budget documents are published on their websites – is con-
stantly improving. While there was a marked difference in 2015, when Slove-
nia had far greater average OLBT (3.49 vs. 2.28), in 2017, the Croatian average 
OLBT almost caught up with the Slovenian average (3.46 vs. 3.67).
Since in both Croatia and Slovenia three of the five key budget documents 
are mandatory, and two voluntary, for the purpose of this paper OLBI is trans-
formed into a binary variable. It takes the value of 1 if the LGU has published 
four or five key budget documents, denoting a transparent LGU, which, in 
addition to being a statutory obligation, publishes a minimum of one volun-
tary budget document; and 0 otherwise. In other words, in investigating the 
determinants of OLBT, this study considers both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure.
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The sample includes 768 LGUs – in Croatia 428 municipalities and 128 cities, 
and in Slovenia 212 municipalities.
3.4 Independent variables
Some possibly interesting and influential independent variables (e.g. Internet 
access) were not investigated, as it was not possible to obtain comparable 
data. Independent variables include internal forces and external pressures 
that could, in accordance with the above-mentioned transparency theories, 
explain what determines OLBT. The internal force (feature) variables in this 
article are the LGU’s administrative capacity (adm_capacity), proxied by the 
average annual number of its employees and the LGU’s wealth (gov_wealth), 
proxied by its p.c. fiscal capacity (operating revenues other than grants). The 
external pressure variables are: the LGU’s size, i.e. the number of inhabitants 
(pop), describing the demand-side capacity; unemployment rate (unemploy-
ment), as a proxy for the economic situation in the LGU; and citizens’ wealth 
(citizen_wealth), proxied by the income p.c. in Croatian, and net salary in Slo-
venian LGUs (Table 1).
In order to test the influence of independent variables on the inclination of 
the LGU to publish key local budget documents, a panel logistic regression for 
the 2015-2017 period is used, separately for Croatian and Slovenian LGUs, as 
well as for the total sample.
The model specification is as follows:
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
	  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 
where P is the probability that an LGU will achieve higher budget transpar-
ency levels (publishing 4 or 5 budget documents online, i.e. at least one vol-
untary document); µ0 is a constant term; i denotes LGU; t is time; µ are the pa-
rameters to be estimated; ε is the error term. Included independent variables 
are defined above.
4 Results and analysis
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics - in panel A for the continuous (ex-
planatory) variables and in panel B for the discrete (dependent) variable. The 
sub-samples of Croatian and Slovenian LGUs show significant differences in 
certain variables that could have an important impact on OLBT. In particular, 
Croatian LGUs have a much higher average value for the unemployment rate 
than the Slovenian do. Regarding the gov_wealth variable, proxied by fiscal 
capacity p.c. (operating revenues other than grants), Slovenian LGUs have on 
average more than double the amount of Croatian LGUs (820 vs. 372 EUR 
p.c.).
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Before estimating the regression equation, the relationship among covari-
ates is explored. Accordingly, to test the presence of multicollinearity, tables 
A1, A2 and A3 in Appendix show correlation matrices for Croatia, Slovenia, 
and the pooled sample, respectively. If the correlation values among covari-
ates are 0.75 or above, there is a multicollinearity issue (Gesuele et al., 2017).
 Table A1 shows that the dependent variable OLBI has a statistically signifi-
cant, linear and expected relationship with the independent variables. It also 
suggests a multicollinearity problem, i.e. a high correlation between pop and 
adm_capacity (0.78), which is taken into account in estimating the regression 
equation, so two models are estimated for the Croatian sample.
With respect to the Slovenian sample, the dependent variable OLBI has statis-
tically significant, linear and expected relationships with all the independent 
variables, with the exception of gov_wealth (nonsignificant relationship) and 
citizen_wealth (negative and nonsignificant relationship) (Table A2). There 
is also a multicollinearity problem between variable pop and adm_capacity 
(0.91), which is taken into account in a regression analysis.
Regarding pooled sample, the dependent variable OLBI has statistically sig-
nificant, linear and expected relationships with all the independent variables, 
with the exception of citizen_wealth (a negative, although barely significant, 
relationship) (Table A3). A multicollinearity issue suggests a high correlation 
between pop and adm_capacity (0.81), which is taken into account when esti-
mating the regression equation.
Since the data indicates larger between than within effects, a random effects 
panel logistic regression is estimated, which allows for modelling heteroge-
neity across units. The random effects model considers both within and be-
tween group variations.
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Table 3 shows that higher population, higher administrative capacity and low-
er unemployment rate in the LGU significantly contribute to greater OLBT. 
These results are consistent for all three samples and in all the models es-
timated. Several authors also found that population positively affects local 
governments’ budget/fiscal transparency (De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero, 
2016; del Sol, 2013; Guillamón et al., 2011; Styles and Tennyson, 2007; Ott et 
al., 2018; Ott et al., 2019, Benčina et al., 2019). Explanations are usually given 
in two directions. First, LGUs with a larger population usually manage more 
public resources and are therefore faced with greater pressures to account 
for them (demand-side pressures). Second, larger LGUs can employ more hu-
man and material resources and establish an IT division that will also engage 
in transparency and accountability issues.
Manoharan (2013) found a positive relationship between the number of IT 
employees and website adoption. These findings are in line with the results 
obtained in this study, i.e. the greater the number of employees in LGUs (the 
greater the administrative capacity) the greater their OLBT; as confirmed 
in the previous study of Croatian LGUs (Ott et al., 2019). LGUs with higher 
administrative capacities have greater opportunities to produce and publish 
budget documents in a timely manner; and they often have better educated 
and more professional staff than smaller LGUs (Tavares and da Cruz, 2017).
The results also show that higher unemployment reduces budget transparen-
cy; and this relationship is consistent for all – Croatian, Slovenian, and pooled 
sample – and in all estimated models. These findings support previous research 
by (Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013; De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero, 2016; del Sol, 
2013), concluding that a worse economic situation in the LGU (higher unem-
ployment) hinders greater accountability and transparency in local authorities.
Results for variable gov_wealth – representing the fiscal capacity of the LGU p.c. 
– are insignificant, except in the pooled sample in the model with population 
included, where the results are positive and significant. The same results were 
previously obtained for Croatia by Ott et al. (2019). This result suggests that 
higher LGU own revenues (fiscal capacity) enable more space, time, and ability 
to be more transparent and accountable to citizens (Gandía et al., 2016; Las-
wad et al., 2005). However, results for this variable are mostly nonsignificant, 
indicating the need for further research to obtain results that are more robust.
For the the citizen_wealth variable, the results are positive and significant only 
in the Croatian sample as previously proved in Ott et al., (2018) and Ott et 
al. (2019). This indication of Croatian LGUs with a higher average income p.c. 
being more likely to publish four or five budget documents than units with 
smaller citizen_wealth is in line with several previous researches (Lowatcharin 
and Menifield, 2015; Styles and Tennyson, 2007).
5 Conclusion
This research focused on the determinants of OLBT in two neighbouring coun-
tries – Slovenia and Croatia. Given the common contextual background and a 
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similar pace of democratization – e.g. both countries are EU members – one 
would expect them to have similar levels of OLBT. To see whether this is so, 
it was first necessary to measure their OLBT levels, i.e. to find out how many 
of five key local budget documents (the year-end report, mid-year report, 
budget proposal, enacted budget and citizens’ budget) the 212 municipali-
ties in Slovenia and the 128 cities and the 428 municipalities in Croatia pub-
lish on their web sites. The measurements showed that the average OLBT in 
Croatia and Slovenia – measured by how many of the five budget documents 
are published on their respective websites – although constantly improving 
are neither satisfactory, nor similar. While there was a marked difference in 
2015, when Slovenia had far greater average OLBT (3.49 vs. 2.28), in 2017, 
the Croatian average OLBT had almost caught up with the Slovenian average 
(3.46 vs. 3.67).
After establishing the OLBT levels in the two countries, in order to test the 
influence of various independent variables on the inclination of an LGU to 
publish key local budget documents, a random effects panel logistic regres-
sion for the 2015-2017 period is used, separately for Croatian and Slovenian 
LGUs and then for the whole sample. The analysis shows that higher popula-
tion, higher administrative capacity and lower unemployment rate in the LGU 
significantly contribute to greater OLBT. The results are in line with theoreti-
cal transparency underpinnings and several research efforts, indicating that 
greater population size and higher employment (as demand-side factors), en-
able citizens to put more pressure on local government and, through various 
channels, to scrutinize budget information and demand expansions. On the 
other hand, the greater administrative capacity of a local government (as a 
supply-side factor), reflects its internal capacity to engage in budget transpar-
ency and accountability initiatives. However our hypotheses that residents’ 
income p.c. and LGUs’ fiscal capacity significantly positively contribute to 
greater OLBT can only be partly accepted – they had expected positive sign, 
but were not significant in all models.
While Slovenian local governments showed a higher OLBT from the outset, 
Croatian local governments have only reached this level in the last few years. 
In part, this can be attributed to Slovenia’s earlier reform of public adminis-
tration and the introduction of e-governance, in line with earlier accession to 
EU and EU requirements. Although OLBT is not a comprehensive measure of 
budget transparency, it is based on good budget transparency practices, thus 
providing a basis for greater levels of budget transparency, accountability and 
public participation. Thus the results indicate that more efforts are needed 
from both Croatian and Slovenian local governments, as many of them do not 
even meet the legal requirements of budgetary transparency.
Studies of local budget transparency are of great importance, since they can 
influence decision making at central government levels, and their results can 
also trigger, usually through media coverage, positive peer pressure among 
local governments. Our research shows that legal regulation is obviously a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for improving local budget transpar-
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ency in these two countries, and that capacity of local governments, popula-
tion size and unemployment rate are the main triggers for improvement. This 
article has two main limitations. First, one important feature of budget trans-
parency, the quality of the documents, was not observed; secondly, some 
variables often used by other researchers (e.g. Internet access) were not in-
vestigated. For the former, it would simply be impossible each year to control 
the quality of five budget documents in 768 LGUs over three years and for the 
latter, comparable data are missing.
Despite these limitations, the findings could well make a useful addition to 
the existing body of literature, since the study, with its comprehensive col-
lection of data, is quite rare in Central and Eastern Europe. It might also be 
significant that, despite the differences in the economic and political environ-
ments of these two countries, in the observed period there are nevertheless 
some common determinants of LBT.
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Appendix
Table A1. Correlation matrix for the Croatian sample
OLBI pop
adm_
capacity
unempl
oyment
gov_
wealth
citizen_
wealth
OLBI 1.000
pop 0.276 1.000
adm_capacity 0.220 0.779 1.000
unemployment -0.249 -0.041 0.094 1.000
gov_wealth 0.213 0.110 0.314 -0.475 1.000
citizen_wealth 0.288 0.298 0.285 -0.624 0.600 1.000
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table A2. Correlation matrix for the Slovenian sample
OLBI pop
adm_
capacity
unempl
oyment
gov_
wealth
citizen_
wealth
OLBI 1.000
pop 0.172 1.000
adm_capacity 0.175 0.909 1.000
unemployment -0.085 -0.017 0.039 1.000
gov_wealth 0.004 -0.111 0.096 -0.171 1.000
citizen_wealth -0.030 -0.065 -0.035 -0.091 0.037 1.000
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table A3. Correlation matrix for the pooled sample
OLBI pop
adm_
capacity
unempl
oyment
gov_
wealth
citizen_
wealth
OLBI 1.000
Pop 0.270 1.000
adm_capacity 0.218 0.811 1.000
Unemployment -0.234 -0.071 0.066 1.000
gov_wealth 0.231 0.195 0.273 -0.455 1.000
citizen_wealth -0.052 -0.108 0.004 -0.061 -0.402 1.000
Source: Authors’ calculations
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